Open Index Protocol

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The Open Index Protocol is a standard for decentralized publishing, distribution and payments of all digital media. The specification includes:

  1. How metadata, terms of use, file addressing, and payment information are stored & interoperable
  2. How to search and browse a shared data layer
  3. How network security incentive scales in tandem with value of content in the shared data layer

→ definitly need to add something about blockchaing right?!

  • blockchain for meta data, 2p2 file storage & distribution, cryptocurrency payments
  • Maybe something about where it fits in the decentralized stack or how it will be used? Or what it means for the way content can be accessed?
  • Not sure what it needs… Needs a sort of sum-the-whole-thing-up excitement → what you repeat to a friend about “what it is”

-> no central point of failure - Built in the blockchain - anyone can access and verify - to make sure everything is correct. Webhost can even be verified. Youtube w/out servers, ads & censorship. Optional annoying stuff.

  • Possibly tech stack sketch here?



Jan XX, Devon & Amy James… blah blah blah.


Central points of failure plague current digital distribution architecture. These vectors are vulnerable to attack and can be seen in problems like hacked personal information, spying and censorship. Current architecture also suffers from wasteful redundancy which increases operation costs. Network speed is fragile because speed and popularity are negatively correlated.


Zero central points of failure. Every component of Open Index Protocol is decentralized. The standard creates an open jungle where anyone can distribute and sell digital content. The Open Index Protocol fundamentally changes the economics of content distribution by transforming individually negotiated contract-based services into permissionless digital commodities that can be exchanged with fungible tokens. The system expands the sharing economy to new services.

Why Now?

Twenty years ago, print media changed forever when walled garden services like America Online, CompuServe & Prodigy lost to HTTP and the Open Web. Today, walled garden content distribution services like YouTube, Spotify & Netflix are ripe for similar disruption by the Open Index Protocol.

The current digital content distribution industry is in crisis. Artists blame confusing contract terms. Audiences are so frustrated by the difficulty of accessing content they resort to stealing it. The industry as a whole struggling.

The root of these problems is twofold: 1) current hub and spoke distribution architecture cannot efficiently support market demand, and 2) current solutions were constructed when the technology required for an open standard did not yet exist.

Since 2008, the blockchain and other decentralized technologies have been created that can solve these problems. The Open Index Protocol combines these new technologies, creating a standard for decentralized publishing, distribution and payments of all digital media.

Like AOL and other early Internet services that did not initially use HTTP but eventually adopted it, current services will have to adapt to the open jungle of decentralized content distribution because the market will demand it.

  • this is right!→ the below should change to something more relevant to this audience. Something about censorship, making more money (direct payments, content creators making more while audiences pay less, etc), open jungle - reduces retailer overhead, promoters as global cyber street team, improves quality & performance for audiences
  • Content creators not being paid fairly
  • Audiences not happy with walled gardens

Design Philosophy

Marketplace incentive alignment, transparent/timestamping=open data layer/poor mans patent=information access


  • A sufficiently diverse marketplace will include rational actors who see it as in their best interest to use standards & obey the law.
  • A blockchain-based shared data layer is necessary to protect open information access, provides entropy resistance, and the most efficient technology available.
  • Incentive structures influence outcomes. A trust-minimized, permissionless standard with a sustainable market-based incentive structure fosters cooperation, competition, and iteration; continuously improving product-market-fit.
  • At present, some human governance is necessary. Open Index Protocol Working Group is a potential social central point of failure, this risk is minimized by a distributed, transparent governance structure.


  • Permissionless - Open Index Protocol creates an “open jungle” shared data layer. Anyone can publish, distribute and sell digital content because metadata is protected in the blockchain, content files are stored and distributed peer-to-peer, and payment is made with digital currency. Transport layers for distribution and payments are fully interoperable.
  • Anticensorship - Open Index Protocol is fully transparent. Full global state replication of index data, transparency of all publish attempts including failures, and human readable index data ensure content data is transparent and auditable.
  • Secure - Protocol security is incentivized and verifiable; index is protected by proven Proof-of-Work blockchain. The commercial value of content is connected with the security incentive of the database. System defends against malicious attack, provides token liquidity to publishers, and automates profit margins for miners and traders.
  • Antifragile - app/protocol split - subjective/objective; interoperable - transport layers; free market with alignment/interdependency of incentive structure = co-opetition


  • Publish distribute & sell any digital content
  • Direct payments
  • Set own prices, terms of use
  • Embed & sell anywhere on web → Decentralization as fail-safe
  • Where OIP fits in the decentralized stack
  • Open jungle → many system participants
  • App/Protocol split
  • First iteration of how we support cloud licenses - Digital licensing - if you purchase a license you can use it anywhere, token controled licenses -> (tokenly)
  • (Maybe i should split these based on audience - user, publisher, etc.?)



Publishing is entering content and distribution terms into the Open Index with a message and schema format that conforms with OIP rules in effect at the time of publishing, verified by blockchain timestamp.

A publisher is a rights holder of a piece of content who controls the publisher address used to publish the content in the Open Index. Examples: Musicians, Filmmakers, Video Content Creators, etc.

A publisher address is a unique public key hash (currently: florincoin, roadmap: all cryptos) registered in the Open Index with a message and schema format that conforms with the protocol rules in effect at the time of registering, verified by blockchain timestamp. Required to publish

A publisher name is a unique name in the Open Index global namespace. Not required to publish. Publisher name registration is valid when all of the following conditions are met:

  1. Name registration message includes correct registration fee, as its tx-fee
  2. First name registration message to register a name owns it, according to blockchain timestamp

A publisher name may be transferred to to another party by sending a name transfer message.

A verified publisher name is an optional distinction, valid when all of the following conditions are met: Matches the real name of a rights holder with the rights to the content, sourced from public databases (ie, IMDB, MusicBrainz) A publisher name verification message is shared in at least one social media platform from an account controlled by the rights holder (Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, Steemit, Diaspora, Synereo) we are going to add a time delay here - 1 day

A publish fee is the fee required to validate that the artifact is legitimate. Going to miners. Publish fee for free content is tx fee of data, commercial content is based on calculation. Reference Viggish and how publish fee serves as antispam measure.


An artifact is the announcement of the file location, publisher’s distribution preferences regarding a single piece or collection of content, and metadata about the media. Examples: audio file, video file, 3D printable, PDF, etc.

An artifact is valid when all the following conditions are met:

  1. The message format and schema conforms with OIP rules in effect at the time of publishing, verified by blockchain timestamp
  2. A correct publish fee is paid as a tx-fee

Message format and schema

Artifact pricing and distribution terms of use are controlled by the publisher. Pricing and distribution Terms of Use options are defined as:

  1. Currency: The monetary value in which the publisher is expressing their pricing terms. At this time, most common is “USD.” (need to include a list of country codes, cryptos, etc) - change to OR: fiat or crypto. Currency, fiat, true/false
  2. Scale: The ratio applied to the integer values of commercial and tipping prices, along with the value from the fiat field, to arrive at display prices. Most common at this time is 1000:1. Combining this with the value from the fiat field means that a value of 1000:1 should be interpreted as 1000 units to 1 US Dollar.
  3. SugPlay (Suggested Play): This is the full price to play the piece of content, think "manufacturers suggested retail price.” An integer value, with the scale and fiat values applied in order to display the retail price. For example, a value of 5, with a scale of 1000:1 and fiat of USD would be displayed as 5*1/1000 USD => $0.005, or half of a penny.
  4. MinPlay (Minimum Play): The lowest allowed price to play the piece of content. Used when a retailer is having a sale or promotion. An integer value with scale and fiat values applied to determine price.
  5. SugBuy (Suggested Buy): The full price to buy the piece of content. Currently buying a piece of content means downloading the file, but soon it will mean buying a token that represents playback rights (currently planning to use Tokenly’s protocol - it functions as Ultra Violet on a blockchain).- aren’t doing to do this default, they have to ask/pay for it An integer value with scale and fiat values applied to determine price. We need to add DisPer here - we anticipate this being the larger use case
  6. MinBuy (Minimum Buy): The lowest allowed price to buy a piece of content. Used when a retailer is having a sale or promotion. An integer value with scale and fiat values applied to determine price.
  7. Retail Services: The percent of commercial (or voluntary tipping) value paid to retailers who facilitate relevant commercial (or voluntary tipping) activity. An integer value of 100 or less, can be 0 or omitted. Can be used with non-commercial artifacts (tip-only) to financially incentivize suggestion of high quality free content. This percent is applied to the total transaction price after sales/promotions discounts have been applied. Example: A song priced at $1 (sug)/$0.70 (min) to buy, and $0.015 (sug)/$0.01 (min) to play, offering a 20% retailer cut. The maximum a retailer can discount each piece of content is limited by its own publisher - for this example, any sale would be limited to 30% off for purchases, and 33% for plays.
    • Any normal day, a purchase will result in $0.80 going to the publisher and $0.20 going to the retailer.
    • If the retailer has a 10% sale, a purchase will result in $0.72 going to the publisher and $0.18 going to the retailer, and a play would result in $0.0108 going to the publisher and $0.0027 going to the retailer.
  8. Promoter: Similar to the Amazon Affiliates program. The percent of commercial (or voluntary tipping) value paid to individual content promoters who drive relevant payment activity. An integer value of 100 or less, can be 0 or omitted. Can be used with non-commercial artifacts (tip-only) to financially incentivize promotion of high quality free content. * gets percentage based on price paid after discounts have been applied.
  9. ptpFT (Pin to Play Free Threshold): The number of nodes at any given time that can get free access to a file in exchange for pinning (aka: seeding) the file. Creates the option for publishers offer limited access to free content in exchange for file distribution which eliminates the publisher’s file storage and distribution costs. A positive integer value, can be 0 or omitted. We expect a number of market determined mean values will develop, depending on the type of content and target audience. We estimate popular albums of high bitrate MP3s will have an ideal ptpFT value of ~8, whereas a long video or movie will have an ideal value of ~20. *We should add to tested, or show our test or something
  10. ptpDT (Pin to Play Discount Threshold): The number of nodes at any given time, past the threshold of those getting free access, that can get discounted access in exchange for pinning the file. Even when a file has a decent swarm of nodes pinning it (estimated: 10-20), there is added (although diminishing) benefit from more nodes in a swarm. The Pay to Play Discount Threshold provides an incentive for end users to participate in the "pin to play" system because some files will be free and some will be discounted. A positive integer value, can be 0 or omitted, or can be -1 if the publisher wishes to put no limits on the number of nodes receiving this discount.
  11. ptpDP (Pin to Play Discount Percent): An integer value of 100 or less, can be 0 or omitted, only relevant if artifact contains a value for ptpDT. * percent applied to total transaction amount after discount has been applied.
  12. Fees

    To determine that the correct amount is paid for the publish fee, the history of the tx-fee tokens are evaluated to determine if the tokens are mined, or from circulation. Tokens cycle through the system; publish fees are sent as a tx fee, adding to the standard block reward.

    Tokens are considered mined when all of the following conditions are met: *expand this sentence to sum up concept - mined are to prove that they were not circulated on the market.

    1. Exactly two or three transactions between a) the transaction in which the tokens were newly created or previously spent as a tx fee and mined again b) the tokens being used as the publish fee. If any more than two or three transactions, they must be change sent to self.
    2. The most recent transaction must be from a registered autominer to the publisher.
    3. The earliest transaction must be a block reward transaction.
    4. Specific market data must be in the coinbase as a valid historian message (rental rig cost, flo market prices)
    5. If there are three transactions, the second transaction must be from an OIP-compliant pool to the registered autominer and include in its transaction message which blocks the block-reward payout was for (since pools delay payouts by varying numbers of blocks).

    When tokens are mined, the USD-per-FLO offer price value is determined by the cost to mine at the blockchain timestamp and the historian message in the coinbase when it was mined.

    Tokens are considered from circulation if any of the conditions required to be mined are not met. When tokens are from circulation, USD-per-FLO value is calculated based on the average exchange price at the time of the blockchain timestamp when the publish attempt is made using historian data from the index blockchain.

    Fee is calculated differently for free content and commercial content.

    • Free content: If an artifact contains only free content, the publish fee is calculated based on the size of the index data and the cost per kilobite to store the message in the index blockchain.
    • To calculate a publish fee for free content send a POST api request to:

    We need to show the calculation here & explain what those things are. Post data isn’t needed. POST Data:

    "artSize": 1422,
    "floPerKb": 0.01,
    "USDperFLO": 0.00472


    "status": "Success",
    "response": {
    "pubFeeUSD": 0.0000472,
    "pubFeeFLO": 0.01

    Commercial content: If an artifact includes any commercial content, the publish fee is a function of (1) the commercial value of the content, called artCost and (2) the current average cost of all commercial artifacts published in the Open Index, called avgArtCost. * add whichever one is greater - total data + commercial pricing The artCost (artifact cost) is the mathematical mean between the MinPlay prices and the SugBuy prices. Examples: A single with a MinPlay of $0.01 and a SugBuy of $1, has an artCost of $0.51. An album with 10 tracks and each song with a MinPlay of $0.01 and a SugBuy of $1, has an artCost of $5.05. The avgArtCost (average artifact cost ) is the average cost of all artifacts published in the Open Index, to find, send a GET api request to: Note, lookup the current market-based USDperFLO at this endpoint: Currently, a hard-coded value of used, roadmap plan is for the floPerKb to be found at an API endpoint. To calculate a publish fee for commercial content send a POST api request to: POST Data: { "artCost": 5.05, "avgArtCost": 1.0188607594936707, "artSize": 10000, "floPerKb": 0.01, "USDperFLO": 0.00472 } Result: { "status": "Success", "response": { "pubFeeUSD": 2.3207140797380124, "pubFeeFLO": 491.6767118089009 } }

    To see these formulae, select the Publish Fee tab

    retailers A retailer is an interface for end users to find/discover content and make purchases.

    Examples: websites, smart phone apps, smart TV apps and physical kiosks. 

    An interface is considered a retailer when any of the following services are provided: 1) hosting a marketplace 2) providing payment processing services

    Protocol compliance is a set of rules intended to address considerations of 1) law, 2) content persistence, 3) terms of use enforcement. These considerations are historically controlled with DRM via a central authority; protocol compliance enforcement addresses these considerations and protects permissionless use of OIP. The Open Index Protocol Working Group will maintain open source reference software (working title: PayProc) to standardize and automate protocol compliance reporting.

    A retailer is protocol compliant when all of the following conditions are met: Check to make sure that retailers must have easy dmca reporting. Also complainer has to confirm identity or demonstrate that it belongs to them - we are opposite of YouTube, default to trusting content creators. Send a retailer registration message with a publicly visible payment address to the Open Index, default payment address is currently planned to be BTC. Contribute to available storage and bandwidth by running a protocol supported version of pinbotwizard, software that manages storage of the files published to the Open Index. Pinbotwizard maintains a minimum threshold of pins to ensure content persistence, current planned minimum is 4. Pinbotwizard nodes pin only unpopular files; pinning of popular files is incentivized by "Pin to play" (as defined in Artifact terms of use section above). Pinbotwizard development status: Current - pinbotwizard pins 100% of all files published to the Open Index. Roadmap - pinbotwizard will track the pin count of each file and only pin files that are under the minimum threshold of pins. When there are greater than 4 retailers, further logic will be added to dynamically adjust each retailer file pinning requirement proportional to the retailer’s revenue. Comply with DMCA takedown requests for any content published to the Open Index. Retailers can receive DMCA takedown requests for 1) not respecting the publisher terms of use for content published to OIP or 2) hosting pirated content that has been published to OIP. Retailers who do not make a good faith attempt to address DMCA takedown requests within a reasonable time period as determined by OIPWG will be added to a protocol black list and OIP revenue will be terminated. Black list offenses include: distributing content without consent from the rights holder (includes pirated commercial content), distributing content that has been "de-activated" by the publisher, child pornography, revenge porn, etc. Retailers may appeal a takedown request to the OIPWG if the content has 1) not been published to OIP or 2) the content is protected by fair use laws. We dont’ know what is going on with this??? Report standardized commercial activity meta-data once per quarter to the Open Index Protocol Working Group. OIPWG will provide open source software to run the reports which will include only the information necessary to ensure publisher terms of use are respected by all parties taking money from end users. Current planned content of the report includes: Timestamped record of each commercial transaction facilitated by the retailer including the transaction ID(s), artifact ID, type of commercial activity (play, buy), total discounts applied by retailer, pin count, and all demographic information the end user opts to share publicly.

    retailers A promoter shares links to content published in the Open Index and is paid a percent of the payment activity driven by these links. Promoters are financially incentivized to share both commercial and non-commercial (tip-only) content. Similar to the Amazon Affiliates program. Examples: social media influencers, bloggers, traditional advertisers

    A promoter account is valid when all of the following conditions are met: Send a promoter registration message with a publicly visible payment address to the Open Index, default payment address is currently planned to be BTC.

    Promoter account types and protocol compliance rules: Verified Account: Connected to a social media account. A verified promoter account is created by posting the hash of the promoter’s registration message on a publicly visible social media feed. A verified publisher account generate an automatic link connecting the share to the promoter for every piece of content shared. Non-Verified Account: Not connected to a social media account. A non-verified promoter must generate a new link connecting the share to the promoter for every piece of content shared. Protocol Compliance: If a promoter account is posing malformed, spoofing or malicious links the publisher account is added to the OIPWG blacklist. miners Miners maintain the security of the index and create the supply of tokens that are sold to publishers. Publisher demand drives index security; OIP connects the publish fee tokens to the index security incentive. The processes for security and file storage/bandwidth are governed by OIP, allowing permissionless participation in offering these services and making them function as fungible commodities. The data for these processes is captured by historan, miners earn their actual costs plus their requested margin with autominer and defend the network without reducing their profit using collaborative defense, traders ensure token availability with autotrader, and trades from miners and traders to publisher are executed by tradebot.

    • The following security rules are currently limited to Florincoin index security, the file storage/distribution process will be similar, but will be formalized when more information on filecoin is available.

    Historian encodes protocol specified data into the block reward coinbase. Historian data is used to determine the price of a block using the factors of (1) the actual cost to mine, (2) the market spot price, (3) the winning pool’s max margin and (4) the winning pool’s percentage of overall hash rate.

    Historian information is considered valid if all of the following data is included: URL of autominer pool that won the block Rental price of the 10 most recent sCrypt rigs rented from, found at API endpoint “Last10” Hashrate of the pool that won the block; found by the winning pool at localhost version of OIP universal API endpoint.* (Alexandria's hosted version: getMiningInfo:networkhashps) Total network hashrate (roadmap: will be replaced by XX) fmd_weighted is the current volume-weighted market exchange price per Florincoin in BTC. Found by the winning pool at localhost version of OIP universal API endpoint* (Alexandria's hosted version: flo-market-data:weighted) fmd_usd is the value of fmd_weighted converted to USD using BTC average. Found by the winning pool at localhost version of OIP universal API endpoint* (Alexandria's hosted version: flo-market-data:USD)

    →this should go in the read me → design philosophy or features → this is about API enpoints, should probably add a section about this - both hosted & local. *by "OIP universal API endpoint" we mean it can be looked up thru any protocol compliant host, or using localhost if running the protocol daemon locally. When this endpoint is needed by any OIP service provider for an internal process, they should look it up using the localhost address, as this ensures that whenever possible data is retrieved and synced using the blockchain's consensus system, and not thru web hosted web services which can be manipulated.

    Autominer manages miner participation in index security and file storage/distribution based on the miner’s unique preferences. It allows miners to ‘set it and forget it,’ and ensures they earn the minimum margin set in their preferences.

    Autominer account is valid when all of the following conditions are met: Send an autominer registration message with a Bitcoin payout address and relevant worker address to the Open Index. Create an account on Make a new “pool profile” using the following information: algo: Scrypt host: port: 3032 worker: *yourflorincoinaddress* password: *anythingyouwant Create a miningrigrentals API key Install and start the autominer_api application. Source Code Fund your wallet with Bitcoin, and the autominer-api will automatically start renting rigs if market conditions allow your minimum margin to be met Add set preferences - Min price - application level. when the offer price is met, it mines

    An autominer pool is any mining pool that properly encodes historian blockchain data into winning blocks.

    An autominer pool is valid when all of the following conditions are met: Send a pool registration message to the Open Index with the URL of the service and the pool target margin. pool target margin - maybe definition here? To update or change the pool URL or target margin, an update message is sent to the Open Index to modify the initial registration data.

    The protocol calculates an offer price for tokens that qualify as mined using the information captured by historian and the target margin set by autominer pools. The offer price will meet the autominer pool target margin if all of the following conditions are met: *add formulas here* Offer price is within <2x market price Pool has >X% of total hashrate

    If the offer price is 2x greater than the market price or the autominer pool has greater than X percent of the total hashrate, the following formula is applied to adjust the offer price down.

    By considering many iterations of the historian data from multiple blocks (ideally by multiple pools) over some period of time, we can summarize the overall market conditions and cost to mine tokens during that given point in time.

    Collaborative Defense is an optional process in autominer; it is an automated process that facilitates security of the network without reducing the users profits. *the set of market conditions & collaborative defense process needs to be defined

    Autotrader -> add this

    Tradebot is an application layer function, built into the UI anywhere that a user will be in need of protocol tokens (Florincoin & Filecoin). Most commonly used in the publishing process when a publisher needs to trade $USD -> BTC -> Florincoin to pay their publish fee. In order to prevent bad actors from abusing the process to sell their market-purchased tokens at a price higher than the market is pricing them, its limited only to the trade of tokens mined by protocol compliant autominer pools, with correctly encoded historian messages the coinbase of the tokens.

    Add that if not enough tokens in autominer tradebot, secondary option is autotrader tradebot.

    Sequence of Operations: Receive request for "next offer" including the total publish fee requested (denominated in fiat, not tokens) Check Open Index for the next block reward with a historian message in the coinbase Send "are you online" message to relevant Autominer nodes If a node responds that it is online, calculate the BTC total to send to complete their "open offers” If the whole publish fee is not covered by this trade, go back and loop steps 2-5 until it is Send a sendmany transaction to the autotrader nodes and wait for them to send tokens back

    Tradebot offer price calculation The variables in the equation are: Market price, supplied by market Cost to mine, supplied by market Each pools mining percent, supplied by Blockchain A threshold variable multiplier of market price, supplied by oipwg And a threshold variable hash rate limit, provided by oipwg

    File Storage & Distribution

    To be written: include issues of persistence & quality: pin to play, pinbotwizard, paid hosting via filecoin, sia, etc. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS Adversarial thinking or “red team” assessment has been an essential component in the process of building Open Index Protocol. This overview summarizes the questions, solutions & security considerations that have been analysed. Can’t find an answer to your question or concern? Email it to assumptions

    The marketplace will include rational actors who see it as in their best interest to use standards & obey the law. A unified data layer is necessary to protect freedom of information (and access to content. free information access, open information access? Entropy resistant?) and the most efficient technology available. Incentive structures influence outcomes. A trust-minimized, permissionless standard with a market-based, sustainable incentive structure fosters cooperation, competition and iteration; continuously improving product market fit. At present, some human governance is necessary. Although the Open Index Protocol Working Group is a potential social central point of failure, this risk is minimized by a distributed, transparent governance structure. legal considerations Protocol Compliance and filtering lists are used to address issues of law (see definitions in Open Index Protocol Standards, section C, “retailers”).

    protocol/app layer differentiation

    • possibly add intro (parody with incentive structure) here that discusses the protocol/app layer differentiation & how the smarter approach to piracy is to incentivize compliance (not drm).

    DMCA & piracy As required for the index to be trustworthy and transparent, OIP does not filter content during the publishing process. However, the content index is filtered by retailers when their front ends display content to users and by payment processors when payment is sent from user to publisher. Retailers and payment processors must enforce protocol compliance filters established by the Open Index Protocol Working Group. Payment addresses for retailers and payment processors who do not comply with protocol compliance standards will be blacklisted.

    Piracy of professional / entertainment industry content What happens if a registered publisher attempts to publish content it does not have rights for?

    The protocol compliance standard requires retailers and payment processors follow their local laws. In jurisdictions where DMCA and other content protection laws exist, pirated content is therefore included in the protocol compliance standard. IMDB, MusicBrainz and other open databases will be used to determine if a publisher holds the rights to the content, resulting in a filter between the entire index blockchain and the content supported by retailers and payment processors.

    When professional entertainment industry content in databases like IMBD, Music Brainz, etc is published by an anonymous publisher, retailers will be encouraged to provide a “request publisher verification” process. Using this process, they send a request to the rights-holder found in these public databases asking them to verify their publisher account. Retailers will already be using various protocol and application level services to optimize the meta-data associated with artifacts to make content easier for their audiences to find, so it does not add significant time, work or code to find contact information for the rights holders in public databases. The “request publisher verification” process will encourage rights-holders who are not yet aware of OIP with incentive to learn about it’s benefits because of demonstrated audience demand.
    To receive revenue through OIP, retailers and payment processors must comply with OIP standards, including the requirement that they abide by the laws of their country and provide an easy method of reporting DMCA violations. Thus, it is in the best interest of retailers and payment processors to proactively maintain protocol compliance by filtering content that is likely to be pirated. The protocol compliance standard is enforced by a blacklist; if a retailer is not protocol compliant, it will be added to the “distribution violations” blacklist maintained the Open Index Protocol Working Group. By using entertainment industry databases and comparing them with publisher data, content that is likely to be pirated is identified. Registering a publisher name is optional, but without doing so, a publisher will show up as “anonymous” to the OIP Daemon API. Retailers can use this information to filter out content published by an anonymous publisher that is listed in industry databases unless it has a verified publisher.

    What happens if a pirate registers an unclaimed publisher account name to falsely appear as a rights holder of the content the pirate wants to publish/distribute/sell?

    As described above, if retailers or payment processors are not protocol compliant, their revenues are terminated. To ensure compliance and continued revenues, these businesses may choose to include additional filters such as Verified Publisher (see Open Index Protocol Standards, section A, “publishers”). Some pirates may seek out unregistered names of high profile content rights holders and attempt to register these names to appear as a rights holder of the pirated content they want to distribute. However, unless the name is verified on a supported social media platform, the publisher account is considered unverified. To mitigate blacklist risk, retailers and payment processors can choose to not display content that is listed in professional databases like IMDB and MusicBrainz unless it has a Verified Publisher.

    What happens if a piracy site does not honor publisher terms of use and distributes content for free or a reduced price? (Example: Popcorn Time,

    Although piracy sites are driven by multiple overlapping motivations, many profess idealism about information freedom and access to content as their core purpose. By using OIP to make content available to anyone, content rights holders remove this reason for piracy; OIP is fully decentralized, meaning it cannot be censored with central points of failure, this results in global freedom of information and access to content. It will become culturally understood that pirates distributing content that is available in OIP are intentionally circumventing the rights holder, making both pirate and potential audience unable to justify the theft as an issue of information freedom/access.
    According to researchers, on aggregate audiences prefer to legally access and pay for content if it meets two fundamental criteria: 1) easy to access and 2) affordably priced. To solve the access issue OIP is fully decentralized and the transport layers are interoperable; this means it can be used by any front end service including social media. A shared data layer increases efficiency and decreases infrastructure costs. The efficiency increase is so remarkable it is possible to significantly reduce the price for the audience, and also significantly increase revenue for the rights holders.
    Borg the pirates, resistance is futile with OIP’s assimilation incentive. Piracy sites receive an enormous amount of user traffic, but have very limited revenue opportunity. Piracy sites incur costs for server fees and development and typically attempt to capture revenue with click-ads, pop-ups and spyware. However, most end users protect themselves by using ad blockers, VPNs and malware detectors which prevent the piracy sites from capturing this potential advertising revenue. Therefore, pirates need to reach larger and larger daily user rates to cover their costs, which in turn makes it easier for law-enforcement to disrupt their operations; even if law enforcement is unable to block DNS addresses of piracy sites, they can conduct server farm raids and spend years in court. The OIP assimilation incentive encourages piracy sites to migrate from being entirely black-hat distribution platforms to grey or even white-hat platforms by offering them an automatic cut of any revenues they generate distributing content published with OIP according to the rights holder’s terms of use. The carrot/stick incentive structure entices them to begin reaping revenues from their traffic via legitimate content distribution and terminates this revenue if they continue to offer a pirated version of the same content; by ignoring pirated content that is not published to OIP, the assimilation incentive converts these sites and their users incrementally. 

    Example: If the rights holder of XX publishes the film using OIP at a price of $1 to watch, $10 to buy and a 15% retailer cut, YY can remove the pirated version from its search index and instead link its users to the OIP version and if a user sends $1 of bitcoin to watch it, the pirate platform will receive $0.15. To increase their earning potential, piracy sites can recognize demand for popular content based on its bittorrent tracker statistics and swap them out for OIP versions. If the piracy site continues to offer the pirated copy of the content in addition to the OIP copy, the OIPWG will add them to the “rights-holder violators” blacklist, and the piracy site will not receive the retailer cut of any transactions processed by protocol compliant payment processors.

    User-generated / New Media Content

    Since an open database of rights holders for user-generated content does not yet exist, content creators are encouraged to use OIP to claim the rights to their content with the blockchain, an open database for all content rights holders to define their unique distribution terms. If user-generated content ownership is questioned, the Open Index Protocol Working Group will act as an arbiter.

    What happens if a pirate publishes user generated content it does not have rights for?

    Retailers are encouraged to provide easy methods to report claims of pirated content. Piracy claims will be verified by Open Index Protocol Working Group which will review evidence  of ownership (example: verification of the content creator’s ownership of a YouTube, Instagram, etc account from which the content was pirated). If the piracy claim is valid, the pirate artifact-id will be added to the “distribution violations” blacklist and if the legitimate rights holder publishes the content to OIP, they will then control the distribution terms and revenue.

    universally abhorrent content & child pornography The Open Index Protocol Working Group is in favor of freedom of information and open access to content with one exception - it prohibits profiting from illegal or universally abhorrent content such as child pornography, snuff pornography and hunting/torturing/murdering humans for sport.

    What happens with abhorrent content like child pornography?

    Algorithms and agencies like Net Nanny will be used to identify publishers, retailers and payment processors who do not comply with this standard, and these payment addresses will be blacklisted. Censorship via blacklist must be judicious & transparent so that Open Index is trustworthy.
    In many countries storing and viewing this kind of universally abhorrent content is illegal; the OIPWG will work with authorities to conduct this process in a safe and legal manner. 

    market vulnerabilities Trust-minimized processes establish a free and transparent marketplace where incentives of publishers, miners and optional middlemen (retailers & promoters) are aligned. Designed as an interdependent, yet antifragile system, the OIPWG governs formulae that align incentive structures. (See definitions in Open Index Protocol Standards, section E, “miners” incentive structure The commercial value of content published with OIP is connected to the mining incentive. For commercial content to be validly published, a specific amount must be paid as a tx fee at the time of publishing. The OIP standard defines a formula to determine this amount with two variables: 1) the retail price of the content being published and 2) the current average retail price of all commercial content in the index.

    Although there are no requirements regarding how the publisher obtains the tokens to pay this fee, to increase ease of use, the OIP standard defines a set of optional automated processes (historian, tradebot, autominer, autotrader). These processes increase ease of access to tokens for publishers and ease of maintaining a consistant profit margin for miners and traders.

    Miners who use these automated processes are required to contribute to the transparent, cooperative and decentralized/distributed work of recording market conditions. When a participating pool wins a block, they include the OIP specified historian data in the transaction message space of the block reward. (see more in OIP Standards historian section). The historian data is then used by the automated processes autominer & autotrader.

    The standards that govern these automated processes create an equal opportunity marketplace that benefits from both cooperation and competition and a system that grows stronger through chaotic expression of individual self interest as miners compete to maximize their margin.

    Normal market conditions creates bell curve of margins captured by miners; outliers caused by market stressor events.

    Blockreward Emission Schedule

    Current estimates project that all Florincoin block rewards will be released by 2027, at that time tx-fees will drive the security incentive.

    What happens to the incentive structure when all new Florincoin block rewards have been released and the miner incentive is driven by tx-fees only?

    OIP standards create an incentive structure that fosters an interdependent ecosystem. The tx-fee for free content is limited to the cost of entering the data into the blockchain, where as the tx-fee for commercial content corresponds with it’s retail price. The retail value of commercial content drives the security incentive; a significant tx-fee incentive will be present as long as there is commercial publishing activity. Driven by publishing demand, the florincoin token supply will be constantly recycled through pools as tx-fees. Its likely that over time some tokens will be destroyed, reducing the overall supply of tokens and causing an increase in token value, especially if OIP user demand grows while overall token supply declines.

    The publish fee which is calculated by the OIP standard, not the Florincoin consensus rules, will supplement the block rewards over time. As applications using OIP get more end users, there will be more incentive to publish content to it, resulting in more net publishing fees. These fees will quickly grow to be larger than the block reward native to Florincoin, and they will be received by miners just like the block reward is. This allows the total supply of florincoin to have a hard cap at 160M tokens, while allowing the incentive to mine the blockchain to continue to grow as long as there is publishing activity to the index. Token value volatility A wide variety of issues can trigger a rapid change in mining and trading markets, especially during rapid growth. Regardless of the reason for a market stressor, the results of a stressor distill to two fundamental issues: 1) incentive alignment (market price of token) and 2) index security (hash rate). The OIP standard defines formulae to address each of these issues; they are designed to incentivize enough cooperation to keep the ecosystem in balance while allowing plenty of room for thriving free market competition.

    What happens if there is a dramatic change in the market price of the token? i. The offer price allowed by the automated process will be affected by dramatic change in the market price of the token. If the market price decreases significantly, and the cost of mining does not decrease proportionately, the margin allowed by the automated trading process may fall, possibly to zero. If the market price increases significantly, the automated process offer price will allow a higher margin, likely the full target margin set by the pool.

    ii. Formula To encourage the offer price for tokens in the automated process to align with the market price of the token, the following formula is used:

    The variable in the formula is used as a multiplier of margin, the OIPWG sets this variable. Currently it is set at 2, therefore, the automated process offer price must be less than 2x the average market price. At the current variable, when the offer price is 1x the market price and below, the winning pool captures its full target margin. As the offer price approaches 2x the market price, the margin calculated in the offer price reduces,with the decrease accelerating to zero margin as it reaches the threshold.

    b. What happens if the market price is higher than the automated process offer price? i. The incentive structure for this formula relies on its alignment with the market price. Certain market stressors will result in market prices for the token being higher than those offered by the automated process. When this happens there are three potential outcomes: 1) miners leave tokens inside the autominer automated process; 2) move tokens to the open market; 3) a second automated process is used to connect publishers to traders in the event that all tokens are moved and no tokens are available in the automated process between publishers and miners.

    Some miners will value ease, consistency and automation more than the risk and management necessary to capture the maximum possible margin by manually trading their tokens. This group will likely choose to leave a portion or all of their mined tokens inside the automated process that connects miners to publishers. Some miners will value capturing the maximum margin possible more than the ease and consistency of the automated process. This group is likely to move a portion or all of their mined tokens out of the automated process and onto the open market. Once tokens have been moved from the automated process onto the open market, they are no longer eligible for use in the automated process.

    ii. Conditions for an Antifragile Market Assuming diversity of miner behavior, it is likely some tokens will remain in the automated process and some will move to the open market. The tokens moved to the open market reduces the number of potential trades in the automated process, resulting in the first group of miners closing their trades sooner. The incentive for the first group is a steady and reliable margin without actively monitoring markets, the incentive for the second group is the opportunity to get a better market price and capture more revenue. The competition between miners to maximize their individual gain functions as a kind of positive stress that benefits the whole market.

    The automated process connecting miners and publishers is first come first serve, using historian messages in the blockchain to identify the chronological order of open trades based on when they were mined. If all miners remove their tokens from the automated process, or whenever there are not enough tokens available in the autominer process to fulfill a publisher request, a secondary automated process is used to connect publishers to traders called autotrader.

    Each tradebot node will have preferences for the length of time it waits for autominer before switching to autotrader. Once initiated, autotrader will offer a trade at the current spot price. If there is no response to a request to trade at spot, then a new request is made at some percent above spot. Autotrader will repeat this process until it finds a percent above spot that is accepted. The autominer & autotrader automated processes make access to publishing tokens as frictionless as possible for both the publisher and the retailer.

    iii. Automated arbitrage Assuming diversity of trader behavior, it is likely some traders will be willing to sell at the average spot price. If there is enough volume and volatility between the exchanges it is likely at least one exchange is trading below the market average spot price. If the trader is able to leverage the difference immediately, they extract an arbitrage gain for facilitating liquidity. However, if the market is narrow (all exchanges trading at prices too close to each other), it is possible that no traders will accept the spot price and a percent above spot will be necessary. This additional percent will not be taken into account in the flow-btc exchange price in the tx-fee required for valid publishing. Various front ends will handle the additional percent charge differently; they may absorb the added fee as a cost of doing business, pass it on to the publisher as an expedience fee, or perhaps offer the option to avoid the additional percentage charge by waiting for their content to be published at some later time when an autotrader user is willing to trade at spot.

    c. What happens if a the token price is sabatoged by token holder(s) dumping significant volume onto the trading market? (Price crash/lower 51% attack resistance)

    This type of attack is impossible to completely ward off, but also an expensive/difficult attack to maintain long term. If a florincoin whale (or group of them) dumped tokens onto the market at a sufficiently high volume, the market price could fall enough to weaken the incentive to mine the index blockchain, and thus lower its resistance to a 51% or long-range attack.

    The suppressed market price and mining level would pull the automated process margin down; unable to receive their target margin, many autominers would likely stop new rig rentals. With fewer autominers competing over a lower hash rate, some may autominers capture their target margin, but if the price is suppressed enough its possible autominers would be unable to capture a margin above their overhead costs.

    No matter how low the token market price temporarily falls, retail service providers and content rights holders will have incentive to protect the index. The automated mining margin is not the primary motivation for these businesses, instead they depend on the accuracy of the content index. This group can work together to protect the index by participating in Collaborative Defense mode as described above. No matter how low the token price falls, they will not lose money because they will trade their tokens at their actual cost.

    If the whale then attempts a 51% attack, those autominers participating in the Collaborative Defense against it would then of course be entitled to the OIPWG-determined margin. ??

    Between the demonstrated resilience of the system against the attack, the artificially suppressed (and thus more accessible) price of tokens and any newfound awareness of the project from the Streisand Effect, eventually the market value will revive and the attacker will lose the ability to continue suppressing the price.

    malicious acts Network Attack, Data Manipulation, Exchange Fraud The incentive structure of OIP is designed to encourage compliance by offering positive rewards, and deter noncompliance by eliminating potential rewards and enforcing blacklists. OIP is fully decentralized, uses interoperable transport layers, and information in the index blockchain is human readable; this combination offers the highest level of transparency possible. Sunshine is the best disinfectant.

    The OIP standard requires registration of publishers, retailers, promoters and miners; this information is logged in the index blockchain. Reputation is transparently available because these users are required to register. Application layer services using OIP can use this information in their reputation management services, optionally combining this transparently available information for both user identity & transaction history to optimize their offering.

    The index blockchain average block time is 40 seconds. When a mining pool using the automated mining margin process wins a block, the OIP standard requires the pool log specific information into the blockchain, called historian data (defined in OIP Standards, section Miners, historian). Selection for data input is determined by the index blockchain’s proof of work security; the winner of the block inputs the historian data.

    A 24 hour moving average of the historian data is used to calculate the protocol offer price and to verify the correct publish fee was paid. The time delay between mining the block reward/inputting historian data and the token sale to the publisher increases the opportunity to identify network attacks. If the network is attacked, historian data input during the attack is excluded from the moving average calculation.

    Proof-of-work governed historian data input combined with the rapid 40 second block time results in diverse and abundant market information that can be averaged to assess the accuracy of the historian data.

    a. What happens if there is a 51% attack? i. Deterrent The processes that automate mining margins includes a formula designed to deter mining pools from attempting to control too much of the network by reducing or eliminating the automated mining margin if the pool controls too much of the network. It includes two variables - the first variable initiates the margin reduction, the second variable is the number at which the margin reaches zero. The margin deceleration increases as the pool hash rate approaches the second variable; currently these variables are set at XX and 50%, these variables are governed by OIPWG.

    Furthermore, if a pool wins XX blocks in a row is defined as a malicious attack, and the associated tokens are not eligible for trade within the automated system.

    ii. Incentive The process that automates mining margins also includes a mechanism designed to incentivize miners to participate in defensive mining in the event of a 51% attack. The Collaborative defense operation ensures miners do not lose money even if the cost to mine during the attack is greater than the current market value of the token. The tokens won during collaborative defense are automatically sold to publishers at a price that covers the miner’s actual cost, no matter how far it is from the market price.

    Retailers, artists, labels, studios and other content rights holders who have published content with OIP or depend on it for their business revenue have a vested stake in the security of the index; assuming diversity of behavior, some of these players will see it as in their best interest to participate in collaborative defense mining, especially because it will not affect their profits.

    The automated system works to ensure that the token value is aligned with the hash rate; and that these are aligned with the value of the data contained in the shared data layer. If a miner is motivated only by the desire overwhelm the network or acquire tokens and is not participating in the automated system, the cost to mine can be driven up by the Collaborative Defense of the miners using the automated system to increase the network hash rate and make the attack more expensive.

    b. What happens if a mining pool attempts to manipulate historian data?

    Historian data (defined in OIP Standards, section Miners, historian) is used in the automated mining/trade process to determine the offer price at which the tokens will be sold. To increase the alignment of the protocol offer price with current market conditions, historian data is calculated as a moving average of historian data points from the previous 24 hour time period.

    Selection for historian data input is random; it is determined by the index blockchain’s proof of work security. To input historian data, a mining pool must win the block. Because of the 51% attack deterrents described above, mining pools are limited to inputting less than XX% of the historian data. Additionally, OIPWG will monitor historian data with a simple script that will flag any data points with a spread of more than X% and investigate accuracy of outlier data points. The time between when the tokens are mined and sold is enough for OIPWG to monitor and react to issues.

    Pool miners do not receive any financial incentive if a pool falsifies historian data. If the manipulated historian data falsifies the information such that the protocol offer price is calculated lower than it should be the pool miners make less money than they would if the data was correct. If the manipulated historian data falsfies the information such taht the protocol offer price is calculated hither than it should be, any artifacts with publish fees calculated on incorrect information will not resolve in the index. This externalizes the issue to the Retailer.

    Miners using the automated mining/trade process sell their tokens to Retailers. If miners input incorrect historian data the fradulent data is identified, it will be omitted from all future protocol calculations. Any publish fees that were paid based on the fraudulent data will not resolve the correct artifact. Because historian data is used to determine the validity of publish fees, it’s likely that retailers will prefer to work with mining pools with excellent reputations, because correct historian data and trade execution reduces the Retailer’s administrative burden.

    Furthermore, if a mining pool is inputting incorrect historain data, the pool is added to an OIPWG blacklist. If blacklisted, the pool’s tokens are not eligable for trade with the automated system, and the incorrect historian data points are omitted when calculating the automated system offer price and validating publish fees.

    There is insufficient incentive for mining pools to input incorrect historian data. If pools attempt to game historian data to increase the offer price and get more money than they should, the manipulated data would be quickly noticed & blacklisted; this manipulation would not result in increased money to the miners. If mining pools attempt to game historian data to incite fear or sabotage the protocol because the falsified data is decreasing the offer price and miners are not recouping their costs, they would also be quickly noticed, blacklisted and falsified historian data points would be omitted from protocol calculations.

    Overall, the incentive structure is slanted toward compliance - mining pool participants with correct data and trade execution will make more money.

    c. What happens if miners or traders fail to complete trades and steal tokens? (Theft of flo for btc trades)

    Service providers like retailers, miners & traders who use the automated system must register in the Open Index/index blockchain. Service provider registration is a necessary component of the system being transparent; the trustworthiness of service provider reputations can be automatically tracked, which allows trades to happen with increased speed and decreased error and fraud.

    Similar to the way mining rental services rate the reliability of hardware providers and allow end users to evaluate the service’s reputation when choosing rentals, various tradebot deployments will rate the reliability and trust of autominer pools & autotrader nodes based on what percent of their past trades were correctly completed. Those who fail to complete a trade and steal tokens will fail to continue receiving trade requests. Positive reputation history increases trust. namespace From concert tickets and domain names to blockchain tokens and namespace, any free market faces the problem of second market speculators if product demand outpaces a limited supply. The risk taken by early speculators to acquire the limited supply can be seen as a necessary step in the process of a product that increases in value.

    What happens with name squatting? In a free market with limited namespace, squatting is essentially unavoidable and expected market behavior. Early speculators choose to assume more risk because of the possibility of increased reward; their activity serves to grow the overall marketplace.

    Unintentional squatting, or “burned” names, may eventually be addressed through a review process arbitrated by the OIPWG. If a name is found to be squatted, the OIPWG could release the name using the filter lists it maintains. This process will be formalized by the OIPWG in the future, the following example illustrates the idea.

    Example: A desired name is not in active use and believed to be squatted. Evidence of squatting is collected from the OIPWG’s retailer reports to demonstrate that the name has not been used to find any content, nor has any content published by it received any comments. Hypothetical example: name must receive at least 1 interaction with a non-sock puppet user per year to mitigate the risk of squatters idly publishing throw-away content to falsify use. Usage requirements like these are easy for a normal content creator to meet, but increase the chances of recovering forgotten or burned names.

    censorship threats Full global state replication of index data, transparency of all publish attempts including fails, and human readable index data ensure index is transparent and resists censorship (see definitions in Open Index Protocol Standards, section XX, “ “ ). Additionally, automated systems for mining and trading protect the blockchain from attack or alteration (detailed in market vulnerabilities above).

    (Is there something to say for parody here? Maybe something about OIPWG as possible central point of failure -> censorship philosophy + transparent architecture)

    decentralization & transparency: fail-safe & open jungle Convenience and existing user behavior patterns will lead most early OIP publishers and audience users to access content via a centralized web-client. All aspects of the OIP standard are decentralized - index layer, storage & transport layer, and payments layer. The convenient web-clients mirror the information protected in the decentralized layers of OIP.

    The architecture of the information capture is design can further enhance censorship resistance. Full global state replication, human readable index data, and transparency of all publish attempts including fails means the index can be permissionlessly audited to evaluate if missing content is absent because of a failure to follow correct publishing standards and not the result of content-based censorship.

    What happens with a DDos, DNS, or other centralized service attack? Any individual artifact in the Open Index can be reached by one of two means; directly via decentralized networking, or via a hosted service on the world wide web. Retail services with web-clients will be required to use a standardized URI format - hostname/playername/artifact or hostname/playername/publisher/artifact.

    If an attacker attempts to block the distribution of an artifact by targeting a web-client with a DDoS attack on their server or a DNS-based attack on their domain name, 3rd party payment processors (browsers, browser extensions, OS-level background applications) will look up a fail-over host which is not currently under attack to serve the content.

    In the event of a coordinated denial of service attack on the all web-clients of all registered retailers, users will have the option to enable fully-decentralized mode in their chosen payment processor, which will sync the blockchain using the p2p consensus system. This will incur high costs to these users, but ultimately defeat any effort to fully censor an artifact from being distributed.

    Attempted censorship like this can have a ricochet effect - the internet has dubbed it the Streisand Effect - whereby the size of the effort to censor information is proportional to the counter-effort to spread it.

    What happens if the OIP Working Group uses blacklist filters for censorship?

    Transparency is the antidote to censorship and is the reason the OIP blockchain has 1) proof of work security, 2) full global state replication of index, 3) zero filtering as content is published to the blockchain, including incorrect/failed publish attempts. If the OIP Working Group uses its power over blacklist filters as a means of censorship, the market will likely respond to this violation of trust by reducing financial & community support. OIPWG’s transparent and distributed governance structure will mitigate this threat. 

    b. What happens if studios/major rights holders resist?

    “Adding content to a private, walled garden on the internet smacks of the old-world America Online ideology:

    While at Sony in 1994, I was sent to Virginia to learn how to build a Sony "app" on AOL (the #3 online service, behind Compuserve & Prodigy at the time) using AOL's proprietary "rainman" platform. Fast forward to Facebook 2007 and see similarities: If you want access to their big base of users, develop something in their proprietary language for their people who live in their walled garden. It was so clear to me back in 1999 that AOL was doomed. But at the time, any criticism of AOL was heresy. For a lot of companies, AOL was the internet.”

    Just as the internet was initially called a passing fad and companies struggled to figure out the best strategy to implement it, resistance from incumbent and institutional players is likely in the beginning. But the tide of technology cannot be stopped. User- generated content alone is XX.

    {The below is beautiful/inspirational but far less technical than the rest of the document and i think perhaps with better data about adoption, etc the point could be made stronger, more “technically” and more suscinctly. ALSO this is the censorhip category - which but we don’t say anything about that in the argument… that should change to cultural shift to seeing non open jungle services as suspect} When content creators of all levels will demonstrate a higher degree of control over their work and greater revenue returns, when social media mavens are able to earn a living participating in a global street team for new content discovery, when indie labels and studios are able to see greater success reaching a wide audience, when quality network television shows are enjoying a golden era of profits due to direct revenues from cable-cutters, and piracy rates are at a historical low because pirate sites finally have an incentive to play by the rules, the studios and other major rights holders will realize OIP is just like the open web. They’ll have to adapt to the open jungle because that is where their customers are.

    Also add argument about piracy incentive? That they would essentially be advocating pirated copies of their works to exist?

    collaborative defense Proof of work security diversifies network stakeholders, guarding against the kind of social attack vectors seen in federated systems and proof of stake security. OIP automated systems for mining and trading further increase the antifragility and scalability of this network.

    What happens when an outside attacker attempts to change the contents of the Open Index, or interrupt the auto-miner, auto-trader or publisher operations? (long-range PoW attack, 51% PoW denial-of-service attack)

    The value of the content in the index is directly tied to the incentive to secure it. The business models of certain OIP stakeholders will incentivize their participation in Collaborative Defense (explained in detail in sections XX).

    Furthermore, the OIPWG will release checkpoints for the blockchain on a periodic basis, limiting how far back in time any attacker could reasonably attempt to change blockchain contents.